The Problem of Freedom in Marxist Thought

I: Introduction.- 1. Point of Departure.- 2. Nature of the Work.- 3. Previous Studies.- 4. Preliminary Survey of the Problems.- 5. Aim and General Outline.- I/The Classics.- II: Marx.- 1. The Emergence of Marx’s Theory of Freedom from the ‘Philosophy of Spirit’.- 1.1. Freedom as the Principle of the Epicurean Philosophy.- 1.2. The Spheres of Human Freedom.- 1.3. The Human Individual as Subject.- 1.4. The Liberal Ideal of Freedom and the Social Nature of Man.- 1.5. Summary.- 2. Freedom and Alienation.- 2.1. Man as a Productive Being.- 2.2. Alienation as the Loss of Freedom.- 2.3. The Overcoming of Alienation Through Communism.- 3. History as the Law-Bound Process of Man’s Liberation.- 3.1. The Laws of History.- 3.2. The Historical Conditions of Human Existence.- 3.3. Freedom as a Historical Category.- 3.4. Freedom and Necessity.- 4. Conclusion: Results and Undecided Issues.- 4.1. The Two Marxian Concepts of Freedom.- 4.2. The Question of Free Will.- 4.3. The Ontological Status of the Individual.- III: Engels.- 1. The Continuation of Marx’s Views.- 1.1. Freedom as Power.- 1.2. Freedom as the Realization of One’s Essence.- 2. The Freedom of Human Activity.- 2.1. The Insight into Necessity.- 2.2. The Structure of the Free Act.- 2.3. The Determined Character of the Free Act.- 3. Human Action and Historical Law.- 4. Freedom of Will.- 5. Summary.- IV: Lenin.- 1. Determinism, Fatalism and Free Will.- 2. Freedom and Necessity.- 3. Purposeful Activity and Natural Process.- 4. Voluntarism and Determinism in History.- 5. Summary.- II/Soviet Philosophy.- V: General Conceptions Concerning the Person.- 1. The Ontological Status of Individual Being.- 1.1. The Substantialist View.- 1.2. Individuals as Systems of Qualities.- 1.3. The Relationist View.- 2. Man as the Ensemble of Social Relations.- 2.1. The Bio-Social Nature of Man.- 2.2. Human Nature and Human Individuality.- 2.3. The Individual Subject and His Social Relations.- 3. The Problem of a Generic Human Nature.- 3.1. The Interpretation of Marx.- 3.2. The Distinction Between Class-Conditioned and Universal Human Factors.- 3.3. The Critique of Anthropologism.- 4. The Nature of the Person.- 4.1. The Normative and Descriptive Notions of the Person.- 4.2. The Specification of the Nature of the Person.- 4.3. The Emphasis on the Social Determination of the Person.- 5. Concluding Remarks.- VI: General Principles of a Theory of Freedom.- 1. The Critique of Voluntarist and Determinist Extremes.- 1.1. The Critique of Voluntarism.- 1.2. The Critique of Rigid Determinism.- 2. The Appraisal of Hegel.- 2.1. Hegel’s Contributions.- 2.2. Hegel’s Alleged Shortcomings.- 3. The Role of Knowledge in Freedom.- 3.1. The Epistemological Presuppositions of Freedom.- 3.2. The Liberating Function of the Creative Cognitive Act.- 4. The Ontological Dimension: Determinism and the Possibility of Freedom.- 4.1. Necessity and Contingency.- 4.2. The Objective Possibilities Inherent in Reality.- 4.3. Causality and Choice in Self-Regulating Systems.- 5. The Structure of Free Activity.- 5.1. Preliminary Delimitations.- 5.2. Analysis of the Elements of Free Activity.- VII: The Different Types and Aspects of Freedom.- 1. Certain Aspects of Finalistic Activity.- 1.1. The Origin and Nature of Goals.- 1.2. Goals as Causes.- 1.3. The Dependence of Goals upon Values.- 2. The Explanation of Free Will.- 2.1. Free Will as Self-Mastery.- 2.2. The Nature of the Will.- 2.3. The Free Character of the Will.- 2.4. The Value-Orientation of Volition.- 3. The Moral Aspect: Freedom and Responsibility.- 4. Socio-Historical Freedom.- 5. Freedom as the Self-Realization of the Person.- VIII: Conclusion.- 1. Summary.- 2. Final Remarks.- Abbreviations.- References.- Index of Names.- Index of Subjects.